Monogamy as a Prisoner's Dilemna
Monogamy as a Prisoners Dilemma:
Non-Monogamy as a Collective Action Problem
J. Hughes
Department of Sociology
University of Connecticut
(e-mail) jhughes@changesurfer.com
originally written January 1992
Abstract
Many ethologists and anthropologists now believe that monogamy is not "natural" behavior for humans. Yet non-monogamous practices have declined with modernization, and the occasional attempts to reintroduce non-monogamous practices in the contemporary West have failed. This paper uses the perspective of rational choice theory and strategic interaction to examine three known equilibrium social states: patriarchal polygyny, loose patriarchal monogamy, and strict monogamy.
The paper then turns to contemporary liberal egalitarian society and examines strategic interactions among sexual consumers with strong non-monogamous preferences. Non-monogamous experimenters are shown to be in a prisoner's dilemma; if all pursue utility-maximizing strategies, their resulting collective satisfaction is less than if they remain monogamous.
Finally, while collective action to enforce non-monogamous norms can resolve the prisoner's dilemma, and make non-monogamy a sustainable sub-culture, the enforcement of these norms are incompatible with the libertinism that motivates egalitarian non-monogamy in the first place.